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Abstract: For some time now the buzzword “transparency” has been bandied about in the media 
almost daily. For example, calls were made for greater transparency in the financial system in 
connection with developments in the Asian financial markets. But the call for greater transparency 
goes far beyond the financial markets. It is now regarded as a necessary part of "good governance" 
demanded of all economic policy makers. As the World Bank's chief economist Joseph Stiglitz put it: 
“No one would dare say that they were against transparency (....): It would be like saying you were 
against motherhood or apple pie.”1 This paper focuses on transparency in monetary policy, in 
particular with respect to the European System of Central Banks. 
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I. Introduction 
In order to introduce a little transparency into the discussion about transparency in the monetary 
policy field, we shall consider two pairs of interrelated questions. The first pair is: Transparency – for 
what purpose and for whom? And the second pair is: Transparency – what should it cover and how 
is to be achieved? 
These questions are answered in the context of monetary policy within the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB). After all, the European Central Bank itself has frequently been accused of 
lacking transparency. Thus a commentary in the renowned newspaper Financial Times said: “The 
ECB intends to make decisions in secret, using forecasts it will not reveal, to achieve objectives it 
does not need to justify.”
1 
 
II. Transparency – for what purpose and for whom? 
Since most economic decisions are made amid uncertainty, assessments of current and future trends 
play a key role in economic decision-making. If these assessments are wrong, the decisions based on 
them – barring lucky chance – are unlikely to be right either. At the microeconomic level, therefore, 
everyone is keen to minimise his or her uncertainty. For this reason institutions operating at the 
macroeconomic level are generally expected to keep the uncertainty associated with their policy as 
small as possible. At the very least they should make sure they do not actually increase existing 
uncertainty. 
With respect to the central bank, this requirement applies in the first instance to uncertainty 
associated with its monetary policy
2. Advocates of ultra-transparency demand that the central bank 
reveal to the parties on the receiving end of its policies each and every strand of reasoning and piece 
of evidence on which its decisions were based. This, they claim, would make the central bank more 
predictable for outsiders. The advocates – and potential beneficiaries – of this extreme definition of 
transparency are above all the financial markets. They can profitably convert the information directly 
into transactions. But the call for  greater predictability on the part of the central bank is also 
prompted by the hope of being able to avoid market overreaction and the associated excessive 
                                                                 
1 The Financial Times of 15 October 1998. 
2 In the context of “moral hazard”, on the other hand, it is frequently demanded that the central bank should leave 
the banks unclear about whether or not it will act as a lender of last resort in the event of a crisis. See for example 
Enoch, Carles/Stelle, Peter/Khamis, May (1997).  
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volatility.
3 This applies not least to the period shortly before and after the meetings of the central 
bank’s policy makers. 
However, predictability also has its drawbacks. It can make the central bank a hostage to market 
sentiment. The central bank would then be constrained to act – or rather react – solely in order to 
meet the short-term expectations of outsiders. If the central bank is guided too much by prevailing 
expectations this can lead - as many central bankers have always suspected and as Ben Bernanke 
and Michael Woodford have formally demonstrated
4 - to instabilities and multiple equilibria, which 
reduce total welfare. Hence limits have to be defined for central bank predictability. To ensure that 
the central bank can counteract undesirable developments, it must not be completely predictable at 
all times, i.e. in the short run.
5 Thus European monetary policy makers, too, must have the option of 
taking the financial markets by surprise. We are talking about the short-term horizon, of course. 
Surprises in longer-term policy would be self-defeating as monetary policy must be predictable in the 
long run. This will undoubtedly be true of the policy of the ESCB, too. We shall come back to this 
point when we consider the second pair of questions. 
In addition to the predictability of monetary policy, the transparency debate also emphasises central 
bank accountability. Since the ESCB is ultimately accountable to the public, so the argument goes, it 
must also make available the information needed to evaluate its monetary policies.
6 The 
accountability obligation is, so to speak, the necessary counterweight to central bank independence. 
At the same time, the transparency associated with the accountability obligation should help to build 
up the credibility of European monetary policy from the start. 
According to this argument, the ultimate beneficiary of transparency is the “European public”. This 
remains so even when European institutions such as the European Parliament act as "intermediaries". 
However, this could result in different forms of accountability; these range from hearings before the 
appropriate committees of the European Parliament to a more or less binding commitment by the 
central bank to provide explanations of its own accord whenever it thinks that is necessary. 
It is in the central bank's own interests to make use of transparency in order to build up its credibility. 
Since transparency makes it easier for the public to make an ex post assessment of the ESCB's 
monetary policy stance, the ex ante statements made by the central bank gain greater credibility. 
                                                                 
3 See Goodfriend, Marvin (1986) and Tabellini, Guido (1987). 
4 See Bernanke, Ben S./Woodford, Michael (1997) and Woodford, Michael (1994). 
5 See for example, Bhattacharya, Uptal/Weller, Paul (1997). 
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This in turn is necessary to enable the ESCB to stabilise long-term inflation expectations - which have 
a major bearing on the rate of price increases - at a low level. Hence it would be wrong to imply that 
the ESCB is not interested in transparency. The very opposite is true. We shall likewise return later 
to the relevance of central bank credibility to the transparency debate. 
 
III. Transparency - what should it cover and how is to be achieved? 
In economic theory transparency is analysed on the assumption of an asymmetric distribution of 
information. Given a symmetric distribution of the available information, it is not possible for one or 
more of the economic agents to create greater transparency because everyone already has the same 
level of information. It follows, therefore, that calls for a central bank  to improve transparency can 
only relate to information available to itself but not to outsiders. Three possible sources of 
asymmetric information between the central bank and the public need to be distinguished: firstly the 
monetary policy transmission channel, secondly the data and forecasts used by the central bank, and 
thirdly the central bank's objective function. 
 
III.1 The transmission of monetary impulses 
It is by no means clear exactly how monetary policy measures are transmitted to the real economy. 
Although economic theory has identified many different transmission channels (e.g. the interest rate 
channel, the asset channel, the exchange rate channel and the credit channel), assessing their 
empirical relevance is an extremely difficult task. Furthermore, the transmission process could differ 
from one country to another owing to institutional specificities (e.g., the financial system, structure of 
trade). So empirical results for a particular country cannot be applied automatically to another 
country or group of countries.  
Thus uncertainty about the transmission mechanism is likely to be particularly great at the start of 
Stage Three of EMU and for some time afterwards. Studies of the transmission process in monetary 
union are based either on purportedly similar economies or on conclusions drawn from national data. 
But the first approach is handicapped by the insufficient comparability between EMU at Stage Three 
and other economies, while the second approach is handicapped by the problem of aggregating the 
data and the assumptions on which the aggregation is based. One common problem facing all 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 See for example, Briault, Clive B./Haldane, Andrew G./King, Mervin A. (1996).  
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empirical studies is the fact that the transition to monetary union might lead to changes in behaviour 
(“Lucas critique”).
7 Seen in this light, the transmission mechanism remains a largely opaque process, 
particularly during the early stages of monetary union. 
This insufficient knowledge about the transmission process or the effects of monetary policy 
measures exists not only outside but also inside the central bank. It is therefore not so much a 
problem of asymmetric information as insufficient information, which affects everyone equally: the 
central bank can reduce the uncertainty surrounding the transmission mechanism only if it understands 
this process itself. It cannot create transparency in this area since knowledge about the issue is just as 
limited within the central bank as it is outside. And this limited knowledge in turn restricts the 
possibilities for creating transparency in general. This relates to inflation forecasts but also to the task 
of interpreting the trend in monetary growth. 
The demand for transparency of the ESCB’s thinking with regard to the transmission of monetary 
impulses can therefore only relate to those perceived insights which it considers to be fairly certain. 
One such insight is that monetary policy can have an expansionary impact on real variables at most in 
the short term only. With respect to long-term effects, i.e. the effects persisting after all the 
adjustment processes have run their course, there is now a broad consensus that monetary policy 
determines the development of the aggregate price level. In other words, in the long run inflation can 
only emerge (other things being equal) if a corresponding expansion in the money stock is there. To 
the extent that the ESCB imparts this to the public, it is creating transparency. And it has already 
done so.
8 The announcement of the reference value for M3 growth of 4 ½ percent should be 
interpreted in this light. In addition the ESCB announced that it would provide detailed reasons if 
actual monetary growth were to deviate from the reference value.
9 In this way the ESCB is ensuring 
the aforementioned predictability of its policy in the medium to long term. 
                                                                 
7 Examples of empirical work on the transmission mechanism during Stage Three of EMU are to be found in 
Ramaswamy, Ramana/Sloek, Torsten (1998), Dornbusch, Rüdiger/Favero, Carlo A./Giavazzi, Francesco (1998) and 
Peersman, Gert/Smets, Frank (1998) and the studies mentioned there. 
8 See for example, Duisenberg, Willem F. (1998a), p.5 and likewise Issing, Otmar (1998a), p.14. 
 
9 See Issing, Otmar (1998b), p.13.  
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III.2 Data and forecasts 
The second possible source of asymmetric information between the central bank and outsiders are 
the data and forecasts concerning macroeconomic trends. Data transparency is in principle self-
evident, particularly as many of the data which help to shape monetary policy decisions are compiled 
outside the central bank. It must be remembered, however, that – for practical reasons – a central 
bank cannot publish all its data. It therefore only publicises those data which it believes to be 
important. But  it should not simply publish the “bare figures” but should also provide an 
interpretation. Thus the Bundesbank, in its Monthly Reports and Statistical Supplements, has never 
contented itself with publishing numerical data only but has always explained and commented on the 
underlying trends. The European Central Bank will adopt a similar approach  and thereby create 
transparency. 
Besides analyses of the current economic situation, forecasts also play a key role in monetary policy 
– which is by nature forward-looking. Owing to the long lead-time between a monetary policy 
decision and its effect on the price level, the central bank cannot avoid taking future developments 
into account. 
It is a matter for dispute whether a central bank should publish inflation forecasts. Two aspects 
deserve special mention in this context. Firstly, it should be noted that the publication of an inflation 
forecast is being called for in particular by those who in the debate on monetary policy strategy 
advocate “direct inflation targeting”
10. But that is not the strategy for which the Governing Council of 
the European Central Bank opted. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that a central bank can be 
bound more tightly by the publication of an inflation forecast than is actually warranted by the quality 
of that forecast. In practice a forecast cannot amount to a complete summary of all the information 
relevant to monetary policy decisions. This is mainly because there is no universally optimal 
forecasting method. For example, the specification of the macroeconometric model used for 
forecasting contains a number of degrees of freedom. Moreover, assumptions also have to be made 
regarding the exogenous variables. 
Another problem is that macroeconometric models cannot adequately capture structural changes. 
This problem will become particularly apparent in the early stages of monetary union because the 
likelihood of structural breaks occurring is especially high in the initial phase: the introduction of the 
                                                                 
10 Compare for example Illing, Gerhard (1998).  
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euro will cause financial markets to change. In addition, the mode of operation of the new European 
System of Central Banks will differ from previous practice in some countries. It is also possible that 
private economic agents will behave differently from before in their portfolio decisions. Statements 
and decisions based solely on econometric estimations using historical data may thus be inadequate 
or incorrect. 
This is all the more true if - as at the start of the “euro era” - changes in the relations estimated in 
econometric models cannot be ruled out. However, presumptions about such changes cannot be 
generalised and systematically included in forecasting models. Their inclusion therefore inevitably 
implies discretionary intervention in the models. Incorporating structural changes into the forecasts in 
this way also makes the forecast difficult for outsiders to grasp. 
For all these reasons, the ESCB will not publish inflation forecasts. Publication would bestow on the 
forecasts a status which they simply cannot be accorded in monetary policy decisions. 
The decision not to publish inflation forecasts has already been interpreted as a sign of deficient 
transparency. But what the critics fail to realise is that the alternative would be to publish rather vague 
forecasts which would be opaque to outsiders and would have to be continually adjusted to short-
run developments in an ad hoc fashion. Their relevance for monetary policy decisions might well be 
fairly small and their publication would not increase the transparency of European monetary policy. 
On the contrary, they might even paint a wrong picture of the decision-making process within the 
ESCB. 
It should also be remembered that inflation forecasts contain an interest rate assumption. Those 
central banks which publish their inflation forecasts, such as the Bank of England, in general assume 
constant short-run interest rates. However, this is problematical with respect to creating 
transparency. If the published inflation forecast deviates from the real or normative inflation rate, a 
central bank pursuing an inflation rate target in effect ought to raise short-term interest rates. Yet if 
economic agents base their expectations on the published inflation forecast, their inflation rate 
expectations will be too high. Hence such an inflation forecast can send wrong signals, which runs 
counter to transparency.
11 
Another shortcoming is that inflation forecasts appear in principle to be somewhat arbitrary. This 
criticism is often countered by the argument that competing forecasts compiled inside and outside the 
                                                                 
11 For a different point of view see Illing, Gerhard (1998).  
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central bank would put the “official” inflation forecast into perspective. But this still does not resolve 
the transparency problem. How can the public judge different assessments and the debate about 
their respective merits? How can Joe Public be expected to evaluate a specialist discussion among 
experts about appropriate assumptions and the better forecasting method? Given divergent 
assessments of the “correct” inflation forecast, the public will find it difficult to evaluate the policy 
pursued by the central bank. 
By comparison, it is easier to identify a deviation of the reference value for the money stock from the 
actual growth of this aggregate. However, analysing these deviations can prove to be just as 
complicated as interpreting inflation forecasts. This applies especially to the initial phase of the 
ESCB's monetary policy. Thus it is not possible – at least at the present time – to give a clear-cut 
answer to the question of whether a reference value for monetary growth creates more transparency 
than the publication of inflation forecasts. One thing that clearly is fallacious, however, is the 
implication, which has occasionally surfaced during the debate, that inflation forecasts per se create 
greater transparency than a reference value for monetary growth. 
 
III.3 The central bank’s objective function 
The most important point of reference in the theoretical literature on transparency is the central 
bank’s objective function. Asymmetric information exists in this context not only regarding the 
variables to which the central bank attaches particular importance in its decisions but also to the 
respective weight that it assigns to each of these variables. 
The key importance emphasised in the literature to information asymmetry concerning the objective 
function can be explained not least by the fact that the aspects of asymmetric information already 
discussed can also be interpreted solely in the light of this point. Thus in the literature it is postulated 
that it must be possible to draw inferences about a central bank's intentions from observations of its 
monetary policy measures. And this also presupposes that not only the central bank’s views on the 
transmission process but also that the data and forecasts on which the decisions were based are 
known. However, perfect transparency as described in the theoretical literature cannot be achieved 
in the real world. 
The Maastricht Treaty lays down price stability as the primary monetary policy objective of the 
European Central Bank. This has already been defined – and publicly announced – as an increase in  
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the HCPI of less than 2 per cent, and so has been rendered transparent. In order to achieve this 
objective the ESCB must influence the determinants of price movements as appropriate. In the short 
term, however, it can influence price movements only via long-term inflation expectations. 
Monetary policy problems would arise if the public did not believe that the central bank aimed to 
achieve stable prices. This credibility problem was addressed earlier. In the academic literature it is 
associated primarily with the assumption of time-inconsistent behaviour of monetary policy makers. 
In a seminal study Robert Barro and David Gordon
12 showed that monetary policy makers - once a 
given inflation expectation has been factored into the decisions of economic agents - have an 
incentive to induce a higher rate of inflation than that expected. It is argued that, by means of such 
“surprise inflation”, they could achieve for a time a production level higher than the “natural” level of 
output. 
This behaviour on the part of monetary policy makers is often taken as given in the academic 
literature, but it is questioned by central bankers – and with good reason. Thus Alan Blinder, former 
Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the US Federal Reserve Bank, writes: “I can assure 
you that it would not surprise my central banker friends to learn that economic theories that model 
them as seeking to drive unemployment below the natural rate imply that their policies are too 
inflationary. They would no doubt reply, ‘Of course that would be inflationary. That’s why we don’t 
do it’. (...) That is exactly what I felt duty-bound to do while I was Vice Chairman of the Fed”.
13 
A different kind of doubt about the relevance of the time-inconsistency problem was expressed by 
Charles Goodhart.
14 The Barro/Gordon model assumes that the central bank affects the inflation rate 
faster than existing contracts can be revised, for only if this is true it is impossible to incorporate a 
price increase initiated by the central bank into a contract and hence for real effects to ensue. In 
reality, however, it is likely that the transmission of monetary policy measures to prices stretches out 
over a period which is longer than the duration of many contracts.
15 
The objections raised by Blinder and Goodhart to the core notion of time-inconsistency cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. Nonetheless the question arises as to how the ESCB can anchor inflation 
expectations at a low level. How can it demonstrate that it will always pursue an appropriate 
                                                                 
12 Barro, Robert J./Gordon, David B. (1983). See also Kydland, Finn E./Prescott, Edward C. (1977). 
13 Blinder, Alan S. (1998), p. 42f. 
14 See for example, Goodhart, Charles/Huang, Haizhou (1995). 
15 For a discussion of the relevance to reality in the “time inconsistency” literature See also McCallum, Bennett T. 
(1995).  
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monetary policy? Some experts argue that it can always claim to do so (“cheap talk”), but that it can 
credibly underpin its policy only by quickly publishing the minutes of ECB Council meetings and the 
votes of its members. 
The minutes, it is said, would keep the public regularly informed of the background to monetary 
policy decisions. They would be given an insight into the degree of controversy in the monetary 
policy discussions, i.e. how certain or uncertain the Council was in its decisions. This information, it is 
argued, should allow outsiders to gain an insight into the intentions of the ECB Council members and 
thus into the monetary policy objective function. In reality, however, it is doubtful whether publishing 
the minutes and votes of the individual policy makers would in fact create more transparency. It is 
even to be feared that this would actually reduce the efficiency of monetary policy. 
Amazingly, the demand that individual votes be made public is even justified by the assertion that this 
would reduce potential political pressure on Council members.
16 It is claimed that the publication of 
the minutes of ECB Council meetings containing details of the discussion and the individual votes 
would enable the Council members right from the start to erect a barrier against any attempt by their 
national governments to influence them and would underline their determination to honour their 
European mandate. Furthermore, they could also demonstrate to the “European public” in this way 
that they were not being motivated by national considerations. What this argument forgets, however, 
is that under such a scenario the voting pattern and discussion contributions of the individual Council 
members would be influenced by their awareness of their subsequent publication. There is a danger 
that the discussion would not be frank as it is to be subsequently made public. It is important to 
emphasise once again that the members of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank 
have a European mandate, not a national one. If the minutes were to be made public, they might be 
subjected to pressure in their home country
17. This would endanger the independence of the ECB 
Council members and thus of the ESCB as a whole. Therefore non-publication o f the voting 
behaviour of ECB Council members is right and proper. 
This leaves the question of whether it would be valuable to publish the minutes without naming 
names. But this too would hardly stop outsiders from attempting to identify Council members on the 
basis of the opinions expressed. Thus this approach, too, might heighten the sensitivity of the ECB 
Council members to how the "folks back home" will react to their contribution to the discussion. That 
                                                                 
16 See for example, Buiter, Willem H. (1998). 
17 See Issing, Otmar (1998a)  
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is not compatible with the goal of ensuring that  the decision-making process is as efficient as 
possible. Given the ESCB's special nature as a supranational institution, it is therefore to be feared 
that publishing the minutes could entail the danger of a renationalisation of monetary policy. 
In evaluating the ESCB's decision to keep the minutes of meetings confidential it is also pertinent to 
ask just how much transparency would really be achieved if they were made public. In actual fact it 
is rather doubtful – as in the case of inflation forecasts - whether publishing the minutes really would 
enhance transparency decisively. If the minutes were published, the suspicion might arise that other 
meetings had been held prior to that meeting and that the crucial discussion had taken place off the 
record. This  again shows that "perfect transparency", as described in theoretical studies, is not 
possible in practice. In other words, the public never knows whether it really knows everything. We 
must be clear about this point: keeping the minutes of meetings confidential does not prevent or 
resolve these questions – but neither does their publication. This is often forgotten in the debate on 
transparency. There are natural limits to transparency. 
 
III.4 Natural limits to transparency 
In the academic literature "perfect transparency" is regarded as being achieved when the public is 
given all the information it needs to be able to infer the central bank's intentions from its monetary 
policy measures. The theoretical models commonly used are typically based on just a few variables. 
Making all the information available therefore does not entail any great effort. The same applies to 
processing this information.  
In the real world, however, this problem is much more complex. “Perfect transparency” would imply 
that the central bank must make available all the information which contributed, however remotely, to 
its decisions. But on purely practical grounds it cannot publish everything, such as the course and 
results of all workshops, all the committee meetings of the national central banks, every discussion 
about conceptual or statistical definitions, and so on. In practice, therefore, transparency is invariably 
partial and can never be complete and perfect in the sense of the theoretical models. Also it is 
doubtful whether maximum information really creates maximum transparency. 
A certain selection must inevitably be made when publishing information. This is particularly true if the 
central bank wishes to create transparency. And it must also be obvious to the recipients that the 
selection of the information undertaken by the central bank transmits signals. Why is the central bank  
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informing us about this particular issue? And why now? And even if inflation forecasts were to be 
announced, the public would wonder whether this was really the only inflation forecast made by the 
central bank. Similarly, if minutes of meetings were published, some people would ask whether they 
really contain everything that was discussed when deciding on a particular monetary policy measure. 
Moreover, in the real world there are also limits to processing information; the relevant kernel has to 
be selected and interpreted from the mass of data available. This is an easy process in the theoretical 
models of the appropriate literature because usually everyone knows the right model. In reality, 
however, opinions about the (short-run) effects of monetary policy are extremely heterogeneous. 
This means that one and the same piece of information may be interpreted in different ways. And it 
also means that different subsets will be formed from the mass of information available to the 
economic agents who are the target of monetary policy. Thus, an inflation forecast by the central 
bank may be incorporated into the decisions of one observer on a one-to-one basis, while another 
observer suspects that the central bank itself internally relativises the published figure. This varying 
approach to selecting and processing information can lead to sharply divergent assessments and 
actions. 
 
III.5 The ESCB's principal means of creating transparency 
The ESCB has an inherent interest in transparency since it knows that transparency is necessary in 
order to build up credibility quickly. The fact that it does not publish its inflation forecasts or minutes 
of meetings should not be seen as an indication of a reluctance to be transparent since there are good 
reasons in both cases for not doing so. Transparency can also be attained by other means, for 
example, by speeches of the members of the Governing Council, the reports and other publications 
of the European Central Bank and the National Central Banks and the commentaries on the current 
situation, delivered by the President of the European Central Bank directly after every meeting of the 
Governing Council. 
The ESCB will create transparency by regularly informing the public about its assessment of the 
monetary, economic and fiscal situation in EMU and its monetary policy decisions
18. Besides press 
releases, the European Central Bank publish a Monthly Bulletin and an Annual Report. The members 
of the ECB Council will also regularly comment on their monetary policy in speeches and interviews. 
                                                                 
18 See Duisenberg, Willem F. (1998a), p.5/6. See also Duisenberg, Willem F. (1998b) and Issing, Otmar (1998b).  
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Over and above this, the President of the ECB Council will report to the European Parliament four 
times a year. 
When considering all these questions, it must be emphasised that the ESCB has clearly defined its 
price objective. It has precisely defined the relevant variable and has made the number public. It has 
also announced a reference value for monetary growth which enables the public to assess monetary 
policy in the euro area on an ongoing basis and when necessary to demand explanations from the 
ESCB. It is to be expected that these measures as a whole are well suited to making European 
monetary policy transparent. 
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IV. Summary 
To sum up, the ESCB should do all it can to make its policies transparent. However, it must be 
realised that transparency has its limits, inter alia because we still have so little certainty about the 
monetary policy transmission process, particularly in the initial phase of monetary union. If the ECB 
were to publish inflation forecasts, they would inevitably be very vague. However, the uncertainty 
surrounding the transmission mechanism also poses problems of interpreting the trend in monetary 
growth. 
Publishing the minutes of ECB Council meetings might even endanger the efficiency of monetary 
policy in the euro area. But above all, even if inflation forecasts and the minutes of meetings were 
published, the public would never be sure that they really knew everything. In essence, therefore, 
transparency is less a matter of the quantity of information provided than of its plausibility.  
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